tv [untitled] February 19, 2012 3:00pm-3:30pm EST
>> yes. >> -- oppressing them and church of england, of course, was the established church in virginia and that's why jefferson wrote his statute on religious freedom -- >> in 1774. yes. >> right. and he wrote a letter to the danbury baptists stating that -- and these were his words -- the first amendment erected a wall of separation between church and state. that's where the phrase comes from. >> thank you. other questions. how about expansion? yes, ma'am. >> i'm wondering about the authorities who are approving moses austin and stephen f. austin's immigration plan, what knowledge they had of the latour report. >> you mean the spanish officials? >> yes. and if they had knowledge of that -- >> oh, they have knowledge of latour's report, certainly. >> is it then just their sort of
immediate needs kind of overcome that, overtake that knowledge? >> well, first of all, you got to keep in mind -- okay, as i said the report is submitted to the captain jechbl pgeneral of vice royalty of mexico. so it is those high officials, then it circulates and trickles down to the various independent governors. by the time it gets to the independent governors, they are already besieged and beleaguered. they don't have enough men, they don't have enough money, they don't have enough supplies and now you're telling me i got to worry about these americans pouring in. well, hell, i know that. they're already coming. i can see them coming on the horizon. so, yes, they're aware of this, they just couldn't do much about it. by that point in time the spanish government is on the verge of collapse. is that good enough? >> yeah. >> that's all the questions we can take. got to keep moving. we're on tv. >> okay. thank you. >> thank you very much.
joan glen piloted the merry capsule into space. nasa flight and missions separations corrector, gene kranz. he was acting flight director when the apollo 11 astronauts landed on the moon. as lead flight director of the "apollo 13" mission, he and his team played a significant role in guiding three astronauts back to earth after an explosion on the spacecraft. this is part two of an oral history interview conducted for nasa's johnson space center. >> it is time to move on to apollo 12. i can remember pete conrad since you were talking about one great test pilot, another said to me, lord, those guys landed on the moon. what do i do for an encore.
was there a similar feeling here at mission control? >> no, i think that they -- in fact it didn't take a second for the program office to ratchet up the complexity, objectives. once you land on the moon, what are you going to do to top it? i'm going to land next to a surveyor satellite on the moon that was put up there a couple of years ago. we're going to give them a verbal guidance update, they're going to enter into their computer which is going it alter their trajectory so they can land right there. and doggone, if they didn't do it! i think the entire apollo 12 mission had this -- i was sitting back, i was a expect tatar. so it was neat to watch other people do this thing that we had just done. and the mission started off with a real bang, literally. shortly after lift-off, the spacecraft was hit by a couple bolts of lightning and the navigation system, the platform
had started tumbling, the electrical system had dropped offline. they didn't -- mission control literally made no sense. and the young controller became a legend with the call that he made. jerry griffin was flight director. john aaron was just a few second of reflection calls up jerry griffin and says, flight have the crew take sce to ox. this was a recommendation, no flight director had ever heard, no crew had ever heard, no cap com had ever heard. jerry sce to ox? all with a question marks behind them. we voice this up to the crew. pete conrad in the voice tapes that we got after the mission on-board is talking to his crew members. he says, sce to ox? what the hell is that?
we repeat this statement one more. well al bean -- each one of the crew members in the spacecraft had a portion of the command module that they were responsible for. and down in the fourth switch in on the lower edge of the main display panel is a switch which is signal conditioning can equipment power normal auxiliary. so he flips this thing down to auxiliary. all of a sudden the data is restored properly in mission control. now the controllers can get back to work. well, what we had is we had a two-minute window of opportunity, because the concern at that time was, whatever happened on-board the spacecraft may have closed the reactant valve to the fuel cells. if this occurs the fuel cells will starve from oxygen and hydrogen in about two minutes and you can't restart them so it was extremely important to get data back and figure out what happened on-board the spacecraft real quickly. john aaron was the, again, one
of these 26-year-olders in mission control. and he proceeded to talk the crew through bringing the fuel cells back online, and then once they had gotten power restormed normally on-board the spacecraft, but it was a question of another controller will be trying to establish what to do with this tumbling navigation platform, should they pull the circuit breakers, what should they do. but the bottom line is by the time that the crew got to orbit we had restored majority of the spacecraft's system an jerry griffin, in a very gutsy move, and with the help of his leadership, made the decision go to the moon. that day i was sitting in mission control and sig sholberg, the bepty, was very concerned about the impact of the spacecraft by this lightning strike, as was kraft. shulberg went down to the trench and starting pulling these controllers saying, hey,
whatever happened on the spacecraft? if you don't have the confidence to send it out to the moon, i'll support new that decision. i have a picture of chris kraft leaning over the console talking to jerry griffin giving him exactly the same coaching. and it was we don't have to go to the moon today, young man. and this immediately relieved the political pressure to achieve the missions to the point where this team had only the technical issues to work. and in the business of mission control, business of spaceflight, what you got to do is you have to make your decisions based on the technical data and that's this team's job to do. and it is up to the people that sit in the consoles behind the flight director to take the political heat from whatever decision had to be made. and this is the kind of inspired leadership that we had in the program that was capable of stepping up to the plate and buffering the outside world from the technical decisions these guys had to make.
>> i guess, in part, that's because people like kraft had the same experiences that you had, wouldn't you say? as a former flight director, he knew? >> i think kraft's name, christopher columbus, was entirely appropriate for this guy, because he was the pier in in mission control. he launched each one of the mercury missions. but most important he was the mentor, the teacher, the tutor for this first generation of young people who became known as mission controllers. he set the mold for everything that would be done thereafter and in particular, he set the mold for the flight director and the flight director being able to take any action necessary for cruise safety and mission success. chris had been there, he had been/done that. the beauty of it was, even though he physically left the console, he knew what these guys down here were doing, and he
knew his job now was to give them the confidence to make the technical decisions and he was going to broker whatever political fallout might occur back there. spectacular man. >> he was the interface between top-level management and politics. >> yeah. i found this out in later years. because when kraft moved up to center director, i became the flight operations director, the broker, external interface for the sky lab and the shuttle program. so i had an opportunity to feel this political heat that comes down when somebody might want to land a shuttle down at the cape even though we don't think it should be landed at the cape with a fuel cell down or we made a call to a launch when maybe all the mission roles weren't satisfied or we used more propellant than we should have pursuing our mission objective. i managed to spend some time up at headquarters explaining the control team's decisions. >> and you actually walked in
kraft's shoes. well, getting back, however, to the fundamentals of the earlier flights -- because we're coming up on the one that really made you famous, most of all of. even more than the lunar landing which you bossed. nonetheless, "apollo 13" was the story of gene kranz as much as it was fred haise -- >> 13. 13 was again a mission where the basic maturity of this team continued to i mean just spread forth in almost a magnificent fashion. we had made the decision, missions earlier, that we would always have four mission control teams in place during the course of a mission. and this gave us several advantages because quite frequently the mission events don't fit neatly into eight-hour shifts. so a team might have to do what we call a wiffer gill, show up a
shift early or show up a shift late. have the four teams in position made that transition much easier, about it also was designated as a crisis team, that if we had any problems dure t -- during the course of a mission, major problems, this team would try to find some way to work itself offline and the remaining three teams would have the -- would continue to work eight-hour shifts throughout the mission, whatever it turn out to be. my team was designated as lead team and we were responsible -- our principle responsibilities during the mission, we were going to be doing the lunar orbit insertion and also the ascent from the moon and that's what we had been trained to do. during the course it changed dramatically. the launch was normal and our crew members were ken mattingly,
fret hayes and mattingly and hayes were the experts in the lunar module. ken mattingly was a command module pilot but very late in the mission sequence he had been exposed to measles and he was replaced by jack swigert, a maem b member of the back-up crew. we trained with back-up crews so we had all the confidence we needed in jack so it was a question of getting a few extra training runs under his belt with the mission controllers, getting tuned up again and then getting him in to the mission assignment. the mission had been going very well. we had had a minor problem. we lost an engine on the second stage of powered flight. but mission control provided the crew the new engine shut-down times, remaining engines kept working like a champ and they got to orbit. made the decision to inject to
the moon. the injection went normal. transposition, docking, extraction went by the numbers. and as soon as that first sequence of mission events had been accomplished, my team pick up the console and we were following in the shift rotation where we would now take a look over the command service modules and we didn't see anything of significance in the hartford shift operation and basically used this time period in the mission to sort of look ahead at the mission and try to close out any open items that might have been left over from flight planning, mission roles, get the crew tuned up, et cetera. so the first mission went well. and then my team went into one of these wiffer gills. basically whee to get into the sequencing where we would now be in the proper shift for the lunar orbit insertion.
my second shift then was in this new timing sequence. i basically came in eight hours later and during the course of the shift we had the lunar module -- the initial lunar module inspection where the crew would open up the hatch, they'd go into the lunar module and they also had a television broadcast, sort of a tv tour of the lunar module. the television broadcast was concluded and the final -- we were in the process of closing out the items on the shift prior for handing over the team. after the television broadcast was concluded, the families had been behind me in the viewing room and as we left we sort of waved, okay, et cetera they turned the lights out in the viewing room and the final thing
we had to do was get the crew to sleep. and we have a very detailed pre-sleep checklist we go through. it is about five pages in length and we had gone through each one of these checklist items very meticulously because in mission control the greatest error that always lends to a lot of levity at the post-mission party is for some flight controller to miss something in this pre-sleep checklists that causes us to wake up the crew. and we have a series of awards we give out at the parties if this happens. it is not all the jollies. you get really ridden pretty har. so we were really meticulously following through this checklist. we were down to the final item on the checklist. getting ready to close it out. earlier in the shift, we had had a anomaly, a problem with a communications antenna that did not seem to work properly and we were in the process of
troubleshooting this and we came to no answer and i hate to hanover incomplete problems to a next shift. the nature of the problem was, the antenna would not track the earth's signal properly. then all of a sudden after troubleshooting for about 20 minutes, all of a sudden it started tracking and we never figured out what caused this. in a similar fashion we had my e-com had a series of anomalies associated with tank pressures where they'd gone through some very rapid cycling in there and the tank pressure had been reading -- which is reading -- quantity -- reading 87% at that time all after sudden failed and started reading 100%. so we'd had a series of funnies that we had to close out during the course of the shift and we were down to the final entry and the cryogenics, the fuels we use
job board the spacecraft are oxygen and hydrogen, it is a super dense, super cold liquid at launch at high news 300 degrees to minus 400 degrees packed in vacuum tanks. but by the time you're two days into the mission you've used some of these resources and these consumables have turned into a very thick soupy fog or vapor in the tank. like fog on earth, it tends to stratify or develop in layers. so inside the tanks we have some fans we turn on to stir up this mixture and make it uniform so we can measure it. then we use some heaters to raise the pressure for the sleep period. well, we had asked the crew to do this. in the meantime, the next control team was reporting in for shift handol in the room wa up and their flight director was the leader of the black team and we use colors to identify those teams, was sitting next to me at the console, reading my flight
director's log. and we advised the crew that we wanted a cryo stern. jack swigert acknowledged our request and he looked behind him and coming through the tunnel from the lunar module is fred hayes. my e common had t my e com had now switched his attention to the current measurements had he, electrical current measurements, and swigert started the cryo andwas computing the time from the time's point, et cetera, et cetera. all of a sudden i get a series of calls from my controller. my first one says flight, be we've had a computer restart. second controller says, antenna switch. third controller says main bus
interval. and from the spacecraft i hear, hey houston, we've had a problem. swigert called it. then there was a pause for about five seconds. then lovell comes on-board, hey, houston, we got a problem. within mission control, literally nothing made sense in those first few second because the controller's data had gone static briefly and then when it was restored many of the parameters just didn't indicate anything that we had ever before. down in the propulsion area, my controllers all of a sudden saw a lot of jet activities. jets were firing. we then see lovell -- this is all happening in seconds. we then see lovell take control of the spacecraft and s he can kating with us. then for about 60 seconds the calls kept coming in but they
literally made no sense, made no pattern, right on down the line, until finally the training that's given the controllers kicked in and very meticulously they started making relaid up b com at that time and calls very gradually started restoring some of the functions that appeared to be lost on the spacecraft. i had written the time of this event, 55:55:04 and i called over my communications guy and say, can you see if you can take a look at your data and see if anything else happened at the time of that event. he comes back and he says, flight, that's when we also saw this antenna beam switch. went down started a false track thinking, hey, we had had an antenna problem, a glitch in the antenna, some kind of electrical short-circuit similar to the one we'd experienced earlier in that
shift and shortly we had resolved the problem and would be back on track to the moon. in the meantime, however, most of the problems had been resolved. those that remain all focus on the single controller by the name of cy. cy has the system you into toad stay alive in space. power, pressure, he's got electrical, he's got heat, he's got water. basically everything you need to stay alive and none of the data cy has seen from his standpoint is believable. very quickly it looks like we've lost one of our fuel cells and possibly a second one. cryo tank two, oxygen tank two is reading zero. quantity where previously had been reading 100% quantity, temperatures instead of being minus 300-so degrees fahrenheit are now at a plus-17 degrees. i mean that data doesn't make sense. another tank is starting to decrease in pressure.
he's trying to put all these pieces together in the back room. in the meantime a new problem is occurring because we're now approaching what we call gimbal lock. whatever is happening is pushing the spacecraft alone. some of the valves had been shocked close so we have to re-open the valves so the crew has the ability to control the spacecraft altitude. it is tough for me to work with the controllers because interspersed with that we get a call and have to interrupt the thought process and it has to be voiced up to the crew. and for probably about 60 to 90 seconds it's literally chaos in this place. and then it is amazing how this whole thing starts to take focus. we still don't have the slightest clue what's going on. well, this continues in an unresolved fashion until my cap
com comes to me and he says, flight, is there anything that we can do, is there anything that makes sense, is there anything they can trust. and my cap com is sorting acting as my conscience right now because we've been sort of scatter shooting in here. i call the control team up -- and this occurs just about the time the crew's calling down. we realized -- the crew used terms like they've had some kind of a jolt or some kind of a shock. and all of a sudden i start, instead of listening to every controller call and relaying it up, i start being much more select nif this process because i'm starting to get the feeling that this isn't a communications glitch. i'm about five minutes into this problem right now. it is something else. we don't understand it. so i proceed very meticulously. i call the controllers up to tell them, you guys, quit guessing. let's start working this problem. then i used some words that sort of surprised me after the fact.
i say we got a got main bus eight. don't do anything to screw it up and the lunar module is attached and we can use that as laugh boat if we need to. now get me some back-up people in here and get me more communicating resources. i had said these words but then i immediately went back to tracking this thing and it took about 20 minutes and it was really frustrating because the situation is becoming more and more and more and more desperate. we're still not at the bottom because now it looks like this oxygen tank is shot. the second oxygen tank, oxygen tank one, is now continuing to decrease. it would have our fuel cells are offline and these are our principle power generation systems that we use. then they say, hey, flight, i want to shut down fuel cells one and three. i say, cy, let's think about this. he says, no, flight, i think that's the only thing that's going to stop the leaks.
then i go back to him the third time and i say, cy -- he said, yeah, flight, it's time for our final option. and very reluctantly i agree to advise the crew that we're going to shut down fuel cells one and three and about this time kraft has come in. we -- the crew then also realize, they feel very uncomfortable about shutting down these fuel cells. we go through a dialogue that lasts several minutes with the crew until very reluctantly they agree to shut these fuel cells down. and i think this is probably the point in the mission where everybody is realizing that we've now moved into a survival mode. because with 2 of the 3 fuel cells shut down we're not going to the moon anymore, we're just going to be damn lucky to get home. kraft had come in, he was home showering. i had had lenny give him a call and then chris comes in, it's
probably the only vernacular i've ever used that i'd probably use again, i said chris, we're in deep shit. i think that sort of expressed it and chris went up to the console there and plugged in. and again, kraft's business -- his experience in the flight control business and as flight director, he got back up to console. he wasn't bothering me, he was letting me try to extricate myself from whatever problems were occurring in here. by this time, a call came down indicating they're venting something and we came to the conclusion we had some type of explosion on-board the spacecraft and our job now is to start an orderly evacuation from the command module into the lunar module. at the same time, i'm faced with a series of decisions that are all irreversible. at the time the explosion occurred, we're about 200,000 miles from earth, about 50,000
miles from the surface of the moon. we're entering the phase of the mission we use the term enter rg the lunar sphere of infleens. this is where the moon's gravity is becoming much stronger than the earth's gravity and during this period for a very short time, you have two abort options. one which will take you around the month side of the moon and one which will take you all the way around the moon. well, lenny has gone down to the trench, and he's brought me up a list of all of the options that we've got. if i would execute what we call a direct abort, in the next two hours we could be home in about 32 hours. but we would have to do two things. we'd have to jettison the lunar module which i'm thinking of using as a lifeboat, and we'd have to use the main engine and we still have no clue what happened on-board the spacecraft. the other option we got to go around the moon and it is going to take about five days but i only got two gaz days of electrical power. so we're now at the point of mavging the decision, which path
are we going to take. my gut feeling -- and that's all i got -- says don't use the main engine and don't jettison in lunar module. that's all i got is a gut feeling. it's based -- i don't know -- in the flight control business, the flight director business one develop some street smarts and i think every controller has felt this at been time or another and i talk briefly to lenny and he's got this same feeling. meantime my trajectory people are scared out of their wits that we're going to execute this abort, direct abort, because it's very late in the trajectory to make this kind of a computation and swinging this mission around the front side of the moon is going to be very risky job. in the meantime, my systems guys want to get back home as soon as they can because they know they're in deep trouble. so it's now decision time and with nothing more than the gut feeling make the decision to swing the mission around, around the moon rather than come around
front. so this then puts us on the trajectory path that we got to start very rapidly coming up with answers for. we talk briefly to the crew. don't have much time to say why we're doing this and they're willing to follow whatever direction we're going to give them at this time. in the meantime, we've now got the crew moving over to the lunar module, starting the power-up process. glen's team has finally come up to speed to the point where we can hand over to them. my job now as the crisis team is to get off shift and come up with some kind of game plan from here on out. as soon as glen hits the console, he's immediately challenged, because our final fuel cell is now dying and he's got 15 minutes to get over to the get it powered up. but what's most important he has to transfer the navigation data from the land mad ul computer which is dying over t